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One of my intentions in this article is to dispel some of the common
untested assumptions that continue to inform both popular and academic
discussions of "gang" activities in Papua New Guinea. The most preva-
lent of these is that gang members are predominantly from an uneducated
and unemployed lumpenproletariat and in urban areas are products of
squatter settlements peopled by migrants. Such assumptions significantly
influence populist debate, for instance, on the value of sending settlement
dwellers "back to their villages" as a solution to crime. The same assump-
tions guide highly publicized preventive strategies by police, such as peri-
odic mass raids on squatter communities.1 They also affect administrative
policy such as the August 1993 Internal Security Act, with its contingent
_____eI1!-.E~asis~n carrying_id~ntity cards and repatriation of errant mig!:ants-= ~ _
Some derivative assumptions in academic commentaries are that gang
crime is motivated by poverty or relative material deprivation (eg,
Thompson and MacWilliam 1992, 172), or a degree of moral discontent
(eg, Hart Nibbrig 1992).
Another of my intentions is to extend a theme introduced in a previous
article, which argued that gang behavior manifested an integration of pre-
capitalist social behavior into a cash-economic environment. I suggested,
for instance, that the evolution of gangs in Port Moresby in particular
could be interpreted as the evolution of a gift economy fed by crime
(Goddard 1992, 30). An economic anthropological discussion provides a
perspective on the distribution and consumption of stolen goods that may
aid the understanding of alleged motivations to crime, and I hope to show
that some prior commentaries, applying analytic models developed in the
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context of western industrialism, have to some extent misapprehended a
popular rhetoric of disadvantage.
The activities of criminal gangs in Papua New Guinea have been a sub-
focus of debate about the country's "law and order problem," both in the
popular press and in academic literature, for roughly two decades.
Research literature on law and order has been partly motivated by the
formal requirements of a chronic governmental search for a workable
"solution," reaching its zenith in an exhaustive two-volume publication
by the Institute of National Affairs in 1984 (Clifford, Morauta, and
Stuart 1984). The analytic premises of law-and-order discourse inevitably
overdetermine those of discussions of gang crime. The latter are con-
sequently preoccupied with the effects of urbanization, unemployment,
and social inequality. While there is now a large resource of academic
(eg, Biles 1976; Morauta, ed 1986) and policy-oriented (eg, Morgan
1983; Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984) literature on law and order,
the component category of gang crime has received relatively little
detailed analytic attention and little critique of the conventional analytic
premises. Descriptive accounts have been short and have tended toward
generalities from a minimum of presented data (Po'o 1975; Young 1976;
Utulurea 1981), unless the criminal activity is approached in the context
of an analytically prior research focus (eg, Wanek 1982), in which case
- -~he-cla~a-have-Been-select.~-Th€-mGst-substantiaLstudy-has-been-tha
Harris, who attempted a historical account of the rise of gangs and some
predictions about their future (1988). Harris's discussion paper is based
on his own interaction with gangs over a two-year period but presents a
minimum of research data. This may be the result of the ethics of research
among people liable to prosecution and of the need to establish trust
through some guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality.
It is significant, I think, that in the literature on gang crime in Papua
New Guinea theories of delinquency that evolved specifically in the era of
advanced capitalism in industrialized countries are underrepresented. I
am not proposing that these theories, which include for instance drift
theory (Matza 1964), labeling theory (Schur 1973), and a body of theory
focused on subcultural style (Hall and Jefferson 1977), are any more
appropriate for analytical purposes in Papua New Guinea. What distin-
guishes them, in terms of the present discussion, is that they move away
(to varying degrees) from a traditional emphasis on factors such as social
disintegration, anomie, and relative poverty linked to urbanization. The
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prevalence of the older theoretical formulations in discussions of gang
crime in Papua New Guinea suggest an implicit subscription to either of
two general and contrary models of the nature of capitalist penetration in
third world countries. One of these is development theory, from whose
viewpoint Papua New Guinea could be seen to be going through a spe-
cific phase of capitalist development typified by particular social prob-
lems already experienced in the industrialized west. Generalist theories of
this kind imply a more or less inevitable pattern of "development" fol-
lowing a postulated western archetype (see, eg, Rostow 1960) and
attended by unavoidable deviance and delinquency during a period of
socially disruptive urbanization accompanying industrialization. The tra-
ditional opponents of development theory similarly focus on poverty as
an overriding factor in the rise of street crime. Underdevelopment, or
dependency, theorists view third world countries as relatively passive vic-
tims of capitalist exploitation, which is seen as destroying traditional
economies and creating social inequalities that drive the poor to survive
by any means available, including criminal activity (see, eg, Baran 1970).
Liberal populist commentary in Papua New Guinea synthesizes these
themes in broad terms, with journalists and representatives of youth
groups blaming the crime wave on a lack of employment opportunities
for migrant youth and an inappropriate education system perpetuating
__ __ coloniaU_y_introdu~ed_ide_as_a_b_o_uLS_cho_Qlingand_preparing_young_people_ -
for types of jobs that do not exist (Kolma 1993; Nangoi 1993). Resonant
with this approach is a point of view that sees crime as a reaction to per-
ceived social inequalities in the country. For example, Hart Nibbrig, while
acknowledging that criminals are not all from the ranks of the poor
(1992, II9) has argued that "rascals,,3 are driven by a sense of moral
indignation at inequalities introduced by colonialism and structurally
institutionalized in the postcolonial era (Hart Nibbrig 1992, 122-124). A
folk version of the same view held by rural villagers in Papua New
Guinea is reported by Kulick, who has documented representations of
rascals in the discourse of villagers with no direct experience of them. The
villagers believed that rascals were fighting "a kind of protracted guerilla
war against corrupt politicians, greedy businessmen and obstructionist
missionaries" (Kulick 1993, 9). Through discussions of rascals, villagers
were able to express dissatisfaction with "post-colonial, capitalist and
Christian influences that are causing increasing disruption in their lives"
(Kulick 1993,9-10).
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Finally, the notion that rascalism is driven by a kind of moral impera-
tive generated by social injustice is reinforced in the rhetoric of some of
the rascals themselves. A "Robin Hood" attitude is frequently expressed
by gang members as a justification for becoming involved in criminal
activities. Criminals I spoke with in the course of research commonly
invoked a polemic that politicians and the elite in general were the "real"
criminals and that gang activities served the needs of the poor and dispos-
sessed. Gang activity was implicitly heroic banditry and thus largely justi-
fied, and a sojourn in prison was seen as demonstrating the injustice of
society. An academic precedent for Robin Hood imagery is provided by
Reay (1982, 626), who portrayed highland gang leaders as philanthro-
pists, paying a tariff if they sleep in someone's house, giving handouts to
unfortunates met on the road, and so on. Morauta has commented
acutely, however, that "Criminals have learned that academics, bureau-
crats and politicians find poverty and unemployment partly acceptable
excuses for crime" (1986, II).
These academic, journalistic, and folk images of street criminals inte-
grate compellingly into an impressionistic whole. However, the conglom-
erate picture of rascals as organic heroes of the lumpenproletariat, or
delinquent avengers battling sociopolitical injustice, reflects neither the
wide variety of crimes actually incorporated by current local usage of
terms like gan~rascals, nor the socioeconomic position_~LI!!.9~~!J:~~ _
victims of crime. Rascalism during the late colonial era was identified
mostly in terms of the concerns of the colonizers. In the white-dominated
urban areas "rascals" were indigenes who committed petty offenses such
as minor burglaries that could retrospectively be liberally interpreted
as underclass crimes. In contrast, the designations "rascal" or "gang
member" in contemporary Papua New Guinea embrace juvenile pick-
pockets and street-corner thugs along with recidivist murderers and well-
organized groups carrying out meticulously planned major heists. The
majority of victims of crime-most of it unreported (Clifford, Morauta,
and Stuart 1984, 1:15, 30)-are poor, victims of muggings for the sake
of a modest pay packet (the price of a few beers for attackers), female
victims of roadside abduction and rape who do not have the luxury of
traveling relatively safely in a car, victims of theft from their relatively
unprotected homes. While some people are driven to crime by extreme
material deprivation, there are no hard data to suggest that they are pro-
portionately represented in rascalism to the extent suggested by the fore-
".,. ,~r~ ~
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going interpretations. Rascals come from a wide range of socioeconomic
backgrounds, and many of those engaged in the more spectacular forms
of crime have graduated through a range of minor criminal activities that
victimize the poor.
CASE STUDIES
A selection of six short sketches from interviews with prison inmates
(I have changed their names) incarcerated for "major" crimes illustrates
the variety of origins and expressed motives of people engaged in rascal-
ism in Papua New Guinea. The interviews were conducted by myself and
a research colleague, criminologist Anou Borrey, at Bomana Gaol, the
country's largest prison, just outside the capital city, Port Moresby, over a
period of several weeks in 1991. Through the gaol's administration, we
extended an invitation to any inmates to speak informally with us, under
guarantee of anonymity, emphasizing that we wanted to interview "gang
members." Bomana Gaol has a high-security section, but generally con-
forms to westerners' ideas of a prison farm, with high wire rather than
brick walls, and prisoners spending most of their time in the open air. We
sat at a shaded table a little distant from the main administration block,
thereby ensuring confidentiality. The interviews were open-ended conver-
sations that did not follow a stricLqlte$Jinnnair_e_fQrmat,_andinter-v:iewees -
were invited to talk about themselves and their crimes as they wished.
Because self-identifying "gang members" were eager to be interviewed,
they formed a small queue and provided a steady stream of interviewees.
In all, we interviewed fifty people. Recidivist and hardened criminals,
regarding themselves as "big-men" (see Goddard 1992) or would-be big-
men, tended to present themselves boldly and cooperatively, ahead of
"minor" criminals, for interviews.4
Sylvester
Sylvester was married with two children, and in his mid-twenties. He was
supporting his parents and his wife's parents. He told me he was educated
to grade 6, but prison records gave grade 10. At the time of the interview
he was serving a six-year sentence (reduced under appeal from an initial
twelve years) on charges of armed robbery and attempted murder. Prison
records listed him as a high-risk inmate, and he had been put in the high-
security block in a gaol in another province after it was discovered he
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was planning an escape. Sylvester first became involved in crime as a
child, picking pockets in the streets of a provincial town to get easy
money. He graduated to more serious crimes and was associated with the
provincial "branch" of one of the major gangs that grew in Port Moresby.
He continued with criminal activities after getting a skilled-labor job and
marrying, because he wanted to make money and "enjoy" the excitement
of crime. He did not save stolen money, but spent it on a good time. Arms
were easy to obtain, usually through theft, and Sylvester graduated to
well-planned armed robberies. Some of these were "contracted," he said
-that is, somebody would ask him to get a commodity item, for which
he would be paid. He showed no remorse for his lifestyle, and referred to
it at one point as "just a living." He regarded prison as part of the crimi-
nal lifestyle. Prisoners were beaten up when first caught and once in
prison learned to become better criminals from other inmates. He boasted
that he could escape if he wanted t05 and would do so if he received word
of a particularly lucrative robbery being planned. Sylvester felt he had
achieved status through his crimes and incarceration and said he would
return to crime on his release. He said if he gave up crime "people will
think I am scared." The death penalty was being mooted in parliament
when Sylvester was interviewed; he commented that if it were imple-
mented it would make the "law and order" situation worse. Gangs would
_____.~__he_oHige_d to kill potential witnesses, he said. He also felt it would esca-
late the violent potential in criminals like himself: "They'll get me in the
end, but I'll kill innocent people first."
Alphonse
Alphonse was aged about thirty according to himself, or twenty-two
according to prison records. He was married but separated and trying to
organize a divorce. He told me he had no children, but prison records
stated that he had two.6 He was educated to grade 6. At the time of the
interview he was involved in an appeal against a lengthy sentence on rob-
bery and kidnapping charges. He had a long list of convictions and a
lengthy record of escapes and incarceration in maximum security as a
high-risk prisoner and mastermind who had considerable influence over
other inmates. Alphonse's involvement in crime began with petty theft at
the age of thirteen, escalating through car theft and breaking and entering
to major robberies and drug dealing. He regarded himself as a hard-core
criminal and had taken part in amnesty-style conferences with police and
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politicians trying to solve the "law and order" problem. He expressed a
commitment to a life of crime, which he regarded as lucrative. Being in
gaol did not bother him; he saw it as part of the lifestyle, along with the
beatings from police when he was captured and the bullet scars he carried
from shoot-outs and police pursuits. Alphonse claimed that being in
prison did not exclude him from criminal activity, as crimes could be
planned from inside gaol. He had an extensive network of contacts and
boasted that he could escape more or less at will if he wanted to take part
in a crime. Money he obtained from crime was not saved, but used imme-
diately and shared with other people. The proposed death penalty did
not bother him or deter him from further crime. He now considered
he had no other lifestyle and would continue with crime into the forsee-
able future. His separation from his wife was instigated by himself on the
grounds that he could not be both a successful criminal and a family man
at the same time.
Chuck
Chuck was twenty-two or twenty-three, and married with one child. He
was serving a substantial sentence for armed robbery, with time added for
escaping. Chuck was brought up in a Port Moresby suburb and did not
know the language of his natal group, but did not classify himself ethni-
. c_ally_as_a_P_orLMor.eshy_oL~CentraLDistrice~per:son,-because-of--his-pa-r~-- -
entage. He began stealing as a child-a chocolate bar from a super-
market. He was thrown out of school at grade 6 for bad behavior. He
could give no particular reason for becoming involved in crime at such an
early age. His crimes progressed to breaking and entering and robbery,
and by his own estimation he had been in jail nearly a dozen times. He
enjoyed crime as a lifestyle, and had been legitimately employed only
once, for a short period as a storekeeper. Like a number of other inter-
viewees he referred to his activities as "playing crime" and adopted a
"macho" attitude when talking about the inevitable beating at the hands
of police whenever he was caught, using the locally popular quasi-apho-
ristic phrase "one-day pain" in dismissing the discomfort. He used guns
in the commission of crimes and said he would have no hesitation in
shooting someone who did not cooperate with his demands in a holdup.
Although still relatively young, Chuck had successfully organized a num-
ber of fairly major robberies and ran his own small criminal group. Hav-
ing escaped from police custody and from gaol, and spent time in
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maximum security, he regarded himself as a tough hard-core criminal and
saw no change in his lifestyle in the forseeable future.
Nat
Nat was twenty-six or twenty-seven years old, educated to grade 9, and
had several wives. He was currently serving a long sentence for robbery
with violence. Prison documents listed him as a high-risk detainee-a
mastermind with considerable influence over other prisoners. Nat began
his criminal activities in his late teens, with car theft and burglary, work-
ing his way up to armed robbery. In his early career he stole guns and
used them to hold up stores. He said he did not like the idea of killing
people, and regarded his use of guns as a way of frightening people.
(Nat's attitude contrasted with most of the other people interviewed, who
said they would not hesitate to fire if their victims did not immediately
cooperate.) He gave up crime a couple of times and got legitimate work
as a salesman, storekeeper, and small-time business entrepreneur, but was
not satisfied with the money he was earning, so returned to a criminal
lifestyle. He did not save money from his crimes, but spent it on a good
time. He preferred stealing money to stealing goods, because money could
be used for immediate gratification. Unlike many other inmates who
spoke with us, Nat expressed an aversion to rape as a gang activity. He
___________s.aid_that in his criminal behavior he kept a narrow focus on getting cash.
He was happy with gang life and would continue with it.
Lou
Lou was a single man in his mid-thirties, who was currently serving a
long sentence for armed robbery. He had some university-level educa-
tion, having flunked a bachelor's degree. He obtained clerical employ-
ment in Port Moresby and found himself under considerable pressure
from kin who became dependent on him for financial support. He could
not save money and could not find a job that paid enough to satisfy the
financial demands of his kin. He eventually attempted to go back to uni-
versity as a self-funding student. At this point, in an effort to get quick
money to pay his way through university, he became involved in crime.
He was caught taking part in a robbery, and sentenced. Although the
robbery was a gang job, and Lou had a reasonably close association with
his fellow criminals, he did not express the same commitment to a life of
crime as most of the other interviewees. He still had hopes of going back
to university at the end of his prison term, but said there would be finan-
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cial problems that might propel him into crime again. (Despite his ratio-
nalization of his criminal activity as an almost regrettable necessity in the
face of financial hardship, Lou was one of the most expansive of inter-
viewees, discussing criminal techniques at length, in great detail, and
with relish.)
Bud
Bud was twenty-four years old, single, an adopted child, with a formal
education to grade 8. He was serving a three-year sentence for rape and
had a previous conviction for armed robbery. He was listed as a high-risk
detainee in prison records, "inciting" other prisoners in previous incarcer-
ations. Bud said in interviews that he had a "bad attitude" at school and
dropped out in his early teens. His adoptive mother was angry with him
and threw him out of the house. He joined a group of young trouble-
makers and became involved in petty theft, which led to his first recorded
offense, for illegal use of a motor vehicle. He was employed as a shop
assistant and warehouse worker, but said his commitment to crime devel-
oped from finding a role-model for himself in the local gang leader. In
interviews, Bud compared himself to young people finding role-models in
sports personalities or celebrities. Despite this declaration and his testi-
mony that he dropped out of school and had been employed, Bud blamed
___the e_du_c_atjOA-S_)~st_em,...p_oliti~ians,_s_o_ciaLine_qualit}',JacLoLop-p_ortunities, . _
and lack of rehabilitation programs in prisons for his lifestyle. He said he
would continue his criminal lifestyle after his release and saw no alterna-
tive open to him. He said he would like to become a better-organized
criminal and learn some accounting and management skills so he could
operate a more businesslike criminal gang.
The purpose of selecting these cases is to disrupt the image of criminals
as proletarian avengers (or, contrarily, as a proletarian menace) by dem-
onstrating a variety in the types of people engaged in crime as a lifestyle.
However, there are some thematic links among the examples. By their
own accounts, five of these men began "playing crime" as children and
graduated through more serious offenses. Minor shoplifting, picking
pockets, and the like seem to have been matters of opportunity rather
than socioeconomic necessity. Most of the interviewees spoke as if they
had committed themselves to a life of crime, which they regarded as
lucrative, even though they had the opportunity of conventional employ-
ment. Further, although the spoils of crime were sometimes large, they
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1995
were consumed, one way or another, very quickly (usually in group
binges-see Goddard 1992, 29), rather than saved or invested in rela-
tively durable symbols of wealth (fancy cars, clothing, etc). In concert,
these observations bring into question the contention that material pov-
erty is a predominant motivational factor. This revision must be recon-
ciled with the rhetoric referred to earlier and exemplified by Bud, which
at first sight seems to appeal to an uncomplicated perception of socio-
economic disparities between rich and poor.
Two significant ideational factors must be analyzed at this point. One
is Papua New Guinean conceptions of the relationship that ought to pre-
vail between individuals with desirable resources and those with whom
they customarily interact through kin-group or exchange ties. The other is
the way in which the majority of Papua New Guineans conceive the phe-
nomenon of "development," which is partly manifest in the disparities
they perceive, and which has passed into the country's lingua francas (Tok
Pisin and Hiri Motu) virtually unchanged from its English-language rep-
resentation. These two factors can be brought together in the context of
crime through a discussion based on the observation that gang behavior
integrates precapitalist social relations into a cash-economic environment
(Goddard 1992).
G-I-F+-EcO-NQM
A number of observers have written about the similarity between gang
leaders and Melanesian big-men (eg, Harris 1988, 26-27; Hart Nibbrig
1992, 117). In her critique of the romanticizing of criminals, Morauta
observed that where Robin Hood (in legend at least) gave his gifts to the
poor as a class, the Papua New Guinean criminal gives to particular indi-
viduals, marking personal rather than class relationships (1986, II). I
have argued that gang leaders are entrepreneurs who gain status and sup-
port through an escalating success in crime and the redistribution of
stolen goods (usually money) in gestures of largesse to family members
and lesser criminals. In return they are able to mobilize support in crimi-
nal activity from people who are indebted to them (Goddard 1992, 27-
29). In other words, they are big-men in a crime-fed gift economy that
involves social relations typical of precapitalist Melanesian societies in
general (although the criminal activity itself is not typical of precapitalist
societies). Most of the more successful criminals I have spoken with have
",I:::, If~~-•. ~
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been proud of their influence and status among their peers and have per-
ceived themselves as big-men of crime. Some of them have appropri-
ate nicknames associated with terms of address customarily used of clan
leaders and respected elder kin.
This behavior invokes a familiar complex of interaction, based on kin
and exchange ties, that has been an analytic preoccupation of anthropolo-
gists since Malinowski's kula observations and his attempt to typologize
relationships of obligation (1966, 166-194). It prevails in the face of
"westernization" and transcends ethnographic distinctions between high-
land and lowland or chiefly and nonchiefly societies. Recent comparative
studies have demonstrated its variations rather than its relative absence
or presence (Feil 1987; Godelier 1986; Knauft 1993, 67-85). In Port
Moresby, where people from a huge diversity of micro-ethnic groups are
thrown together, the competition for jobs, promotion, accommodation,
and other needs is fraught with accusations (often very well founded) of
"wantokism"-the favoring of near and distant kin.?
The gift is a fundamental component of this complex, a vehicle of obli-
gation and, often simultaneously, of prestige. Even Malinowski's example
of a "free gift" from Trobriand father to son was paradoxically "a repay-
ment for the man's relationship to the son's mother" (Malinowski 1966,
179). Gregory contrasted alienable rights over property in commodity-
....]2IQdu<:;ing__sQ<:;~ji~~_with_th_e..illali~DJ1hilit)'._oJJhing£...]2IQ.dllc_e.d_in .. "<:;lan~_ ....
based" societies, and, following Mauss (1954), described gift exchange as
"an exchange of inalienable things between persons who are in a state of
reciprocal dependence" (1982, 19). Further, the gift economy is a debt
economy, in which the acquisition of gift-debtors, rather than the maxi-
mization of profit, is the principal aim. "What a gift transactor desires is
the personal relationships that the exchange of gifts creates, and not the
things themselves" (Gregory 1982, 19). On ceremonial pig exchanges in
the highlands, Feil has commented, "Highlanders themselves continually
allude to the social and political dimensions of the act of
exchange The production of valuables, on the other hand, holds no
real interest Production is mundane, compared to the ceremonial
prestations to which some societies are forever geared" (1987, 269). In
Hau'ofa's lowland Mekeo ethnography, after a presentation of food to an
exchange partner at a formal ceremony, the giver commented "Now I
have given him a burden" (Hau'ofa 1981 , 155).
In competitive (incremental) gift exchange, such as the ceremonial tee
66 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1995
and moka of the highlands, the function of the gift in maintaining and
enhancing prestige is writ large; magnanimity denotes both clan wealth
and the big-man's ability to persuade his kin to entrust him with its dis-
persal, and immediately challenges the prestige of the receiving party. In
balanced (nonincremental) gift exchange-typically found in elder-led
societies (see Gregory 1982, 53- 55 )-prestige is often dealt with more
circumspectly (see, eg, Hau'ofa 1981, I 54ff). In either case, the burden of
obligation is clear, and ceremonial gifts in particular articulate the· two
forms of obligation-between kin, whose cooperation makes the gift pos-
sible, and between exchange partners.
In the formal political sphere of postcolonial Papua New Guinea, this
complex of obligations is a dominant factor in electioneering. Despite the
legal prohibitions packaged into the Westminster system that the country
has inherited, favors are publicly and extensively dispensed by candidates
and expected by voters (see, eg, Mailau 1989, 91; Standish 1983, 108-
109); they are glossed in Tok Pisin as gris (blandishments, bribery, persua-
sion); and kin ties are an important factor in the manipulation of support.
Standish encapsulated the process and its problems aptly in his notes
on the highland politician Iambakey Okuk, who (among many things)
blatantly gave allies and former opponents posts in government organiza-
tions and his own "development" corporation and
complained that his constituents were draining him of funds with their con-
stant requests for contributions towards death payments, bride wealth and so
on, a traditional aspect of the big-man's role. In all this, he was creating obli-
gations that must, by custom, be repaid; but he did so amongst those who
were unable to reciprocate in kind, which creates a sense of unease amongst
Melanesians. At once obligated and grateful, they were thus drawn into his
camp, and many eventually became active members of his faction. This pro-
cess occurs in all political arenas at all times: there are no free lunches.
(Standish 1983, 88)
Later, when Okuk lost an election, despite a notorious distribution of
4000 cartons of beer (96,000 bottles) to all comers on the Kundiawa air-
strip in Simbu Province just before an election liquor ban came into force,
Standish suggested that a lapse in gift-debt strategy may have partly con-
tributed to the loss: "Gifts which are so large and undirected are unrepay-
able and hence do not incur an obligation, so that the recipient can take
without feeling obliged to make a return.... Perhaps, to coin a new term,
a 'mega bigman' is no longer a bigman" (1989,203).
.'-,
.l .
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According to Gregory (1982, II6-II7) the endurance of the gift econ-
omy in the face of capitalism is materially based on the persistence of clan
ownership of land, which has prevented the emergence on a large scale of
a landless proletariat and has preserved clan-based social organization.8
Colonial and neocolonial intervention has resulted not in the destruction
of a traditional economy but in the development of an "ambiguous"
economy, where "things are now gifts, now commodities, depending on
the social context" (Gregory 1982, II7). The transformation of commod-
ities into gifts, that is, the appropriation of products of capitalism for
prestige through distribution and display is, of course, not confined to
such instances as the incorporation of cash, beer, and other western items
into ceremonial exchanges and election campaigns. It is evident through a
spectrum of social behavior, including crime, where the proceeds are con-
sumed or shared (often at the same time, as orgiastic beer drinking is a
popular sequel to a successful operation9) to enhance prestige, repay pre-
vious gifting, and engender future obligation (Goddard 1992, 29-30).
Moreover, the appropriation of the paraphernalia of capitalism into the
gift economy extends to the incorporation of material symbols of "devel-
opment" in general.
"DEVELOPMENT"
Despite its familiarity, the concept of development is opaque, even to its
entrepreneurs, because its referents, such as economic growth and quality
of life, are themselves stipulatively elusive. Definition of the concept is
difficult (Muingnepe 1987; Tapari 1988,4), and among its discussants in
the Papua New Guinean context tends to be by ostension (see, eg, Hughes
and Thirlwall 1988). To most Papua New Guineans, in contrast, the con-
cept presents itself simply and tangibly. Particularly in rural areas, the Tok
Pisin transliteration developmen connotes cash, infrastructure, and ser-
vices such as schools and medical centers. However, their acquisition is
often influenced by complexities of prestige and obligation that are rarely
anticipated by development planners. As "development" is central to
state policy, and development "projects" on a large and small scale are
prolific, a great deal of literature is devoted to the progress of all kinds of
ventures, and much of it records instances of projects involving local
communities or individuals that appear to survive without evolving from
an embryonic state, or that collapse after promising beginnings (King
1990; Tapari 1988).
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Local communities' perceptions of success or failure, however, are
often based on criteria considerably removed from those of development
agents and their consultants. An apt illustration from the late colonial era
is provided by Lawson's account of Kyaka Enga community efforts to
establish a school in 1970. The sum of $1000 (Australian currency was
still being used) was collected; the building of the school used $3°0.
Although the school needed books, pencils, and other equipment, the
remaining $700 was spent on lavish feasting. The Kyaka did not regard
this as waste. "They claim that the whole venture is valuable as an invest-
ment in prestige. The feast itself was of great significance, and the perma-
nent structure remains as a lasting reminder of their achievement"
(Lawson 1971, 10). Lawson also commented on local enterprises in trad-
ing and transport that did not appear to be successful in terms of profit.
"The interesting thing is that these enterprises do not seem to be regarded
as failures by the people concerned.... Trade stores carry an extremely
limited range of items and have an absurdly slow turnover. Despite this,
at my field site there are three separate trade stores, all sharing the same
building" (1971, 10).
In his study of Gorokan involvement in business enterprises in the late
1960s, Finney argued that three motives were evident-profit, service (to
the local community), and prestige.
The quest for the prestige gained by owning and operating a store, a trucking
venture, or some other enterprise is probably the most important investment
motive to consider in understanding the Gorokan propensity to invest.... the
bigger and more visible the capital asset, such as a five-ton truck or a modern
road-side store, the more attractive and prestigious is the investment to the
Gorokans.... When the truck is purchased, the very act of buying is made
dramatic. For example, a man with a truck bank account will withdraw all his
funds in cash and then triumphantly plunk the notes down on the truck
dealer's desk. (Finney 1973, 80-81)
Finney, like Lawson, also drew attention to the phenomenon of the pur-
suit of profit being neglected in favor of the prestige of simply owning a
business (1973, 146- 171).
Monsell-Davis, discussing small business among the Papuan Roro,
commented on motives for business ventures: "If the profit sought from
the enterprise is primarily prestige ... then once the owner has achieved
his political ends he may not be too particular about what happens to his
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venture" (1981,330). He also noted the tension between individual profit
and community obligations: "the individual village business-man may
only expand his ventures to the position where he and his fellows all rec-
ognise some mutual gain-although this may not be a conscious process"
(198 I, 326). This is the complement of prestige: the individual is obliged
to share the benefits of achievement with the community, which is likely
to have contributed to the initial capital accumulation in the first place.
Finney provided an archetypical scene, the newly acquired passenger
truck, carrying clansmen of the proprietary group rather than paying pas-
sengers (1973, 82). The obverse is the obligation of the community
toward the individual who has brought services and prestige to it. Mangi
gave an example of reprisal in the negative case-supporters of losing
election candidates in the highlands destroying government outstations
and schools, which they claimed their candidate had been responsible for
constructing or improving (1992, II2).
The tangle of prestige, obligation, entrepreneurship, and state ser-
vices is Gordian. Development projects, especially those with community
input, whether they be small businesses or infrastructure, become en-
meshed in local variants of the general gift economy whose permutations
are impenetrable from the point of view of "economic growth." Stephen-
son gave an excellent example of a rural youth group engaged in develop-
-mcmt~pf0j@G~s-~ha~ ser-veEi-as-vehiGles-for-peweF--anEi-pl'estige-stmggles-in -
the village community, where the group was intimately linked to a partic-
ular individual attempting to establish himself as a potential community
leader (1987, 58-64). If there is one distinct articulating factor in this
dense phenomenon, it is cash. Borrey, in a discussion of rural highland
attitudes to "development," echoed an observation by Strathern that the
populist desire for development amounts to a desire for "money in their
hands" (Strathern 1976, I, cited in Borrey 1993, 10). She observed that a
preoccupation among young people is finding money to buy beer (1993,
7) and commented of males, "The common aspirational model seems to
be the public servant who is characterised in the community as the person
with a fortnightly income, who has a car, at least one woman, and money
to buy beer. Through handing out beer to other community members he
is able to buy popularity and respect" (Borrey 1993, 10). The desire for
cash in hand, to be consumed immediately through group activities like
alcohol binges, reflects the expectation that items will be shared one way
or another, that the group as a whole should share in the prestige of the
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individual, that businesspeople, politicians, public servants, or anyone
else with access to prestige items will behave like traditional leaders, big-
men, or chiefs, repaying old debts, creating new ones with their generos-
ity. The state, its development projects, national politics, are all drawn
into this system, in which individual entrepreneurs mediate with varying
success between commodity and gift economies.
Borrey has suggested that the highland communities in which she has
conducted criminological research have given the state a "big-man role"
(1993,9-10), that is, the state is regarded as a manipulator and distribu-
tor of wealth in the ideational context of familiar systems of exchange
and obligation. A consequence of this situation is frustration when the
state and its agents do not fulfill customary expectations of the way socio-
economic relations should be conducted. As cash (the most versatile,
therefore the most useful, item of "development") and material symbols
of prestige are the tangible goals in most communities in Papua New
Guinea in respect of development, it should surprise no one that a major
preoccupation is exploring ways of acquiring these things through initiat-
ing relationships with a seemingly recalcitrant state. In the Papua New
Guinean idiom, finding a "road to development" is a common expression
(see, eg, Filer 1990, 8sn, 87), and communities and individuals try vari-
ous strategies, including rot bilong bisnis (Tok Pisin: the business way),
----- ---rot-bilong-Iotu-(-the-religious-way,that-is,-inv0Ivement-in-fu-nd-r-aising---------
church activities), and rot bilong raskol (the criminal way).10 For exam-
ple, a recent strategy that has met with mixed success has been youth
group "walkathons." These groups contrive to get by various means from
their home areas to Port Moresby (arduous trips of hundreds of kilome-
ters), hoping for wide press coverage and meetings with politicians,
whom they then ask for funds for "projects" in their villages. The first
publicized effort of this nature earned the group involved Ksooo, and a
government-chartered flight back across the country to the group's home
area in the Simbu Province, where they were welcomed as celebrities.
While the novelty and newsworthiness of the trip contributed to its
success, the strategy is not proving usable in the long run, and subsequent
efforts by other youth groups have met with disappointment. The pros-
pect of a flood of youth groups arriving in the capital expecting to be
feted, accommodated, and given money has caused a backlash in the
mediaY
In the absence of adherence to the ideology of capitalism, these differ-
_ .m!
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ent strategies are regarded as having equal legitimacy in terms of the
desired goal. The term wok in Tok Pisin, though obviously a translitera-
tion of work, means any goal-oriented activity and does not recognize
distinctions in this regard between, for instance, crime, manipulation of
kin ties, business entrepreneurship, or manual labor. Further, as noted
earlier, clan-based social organization persists in Papua New Guinea, and
landholding social groups are still the dominant form of community. Con-
sequently, the impact of ideologies associated with the commitment of
labor predominantly to commodity production is relatively weak. Meil-
lassoux contended that in agricultural societies where the social relations
of production are kin ordered, labor has no exchange value, because its
products are not immediately alienated from the producer into a general-
ized sphere of exchange where goods can be measured in terms of one
another (1978, 144-146). It follows (in contrast to capitalist ideology)
that labor alone cannot enhance status, because in such societies labor-
power cannot be a commodity (Meillassoux 1978, 144-146). Although
Meillassoux's formulation (based on African fieldwork) requires qualifi-
cation in respect of precapitalist Papua New Guinea,12 it is relevant to
the general case that status is not achieved through increased individual
production, but through the skilled manipulation of resources and social
relationships.
CRIME AS WOK
I have attempted to demonstrate in this discussion the tendency in Papua
New Guinea for the paraphernalia of capitalism, from simple commodi-
ties to "development," to be appropriated into a gift economy where
issues of prestige and obligation prevail over profit and individual accu-
mulation of wealth. Returning to gang activity, a criminal lifestyle consti-
tutes one option or expedient among many through which aspects of the
cash economy can be incorporated into the pursuit of prestige and rela-
tionships of obligation-an alternative option of "legitimate" employ-
ment was foregone or discarded in most of the six examples presented
earlier. Crime is wok like other goal-oriented activity. Among the peers of
the criminal, prestige can be gained, and obligation engendered, by skill-
ful gifting and manipulation, no less than in the case of the business entre-
preneur or successful politician.
By the application of this perspective on motivations to criminal life-
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styles, some sense can be made of a phenomenon that many commen-
taries on crime do not address: the group conversion of "committed"
criminals. A common occurrence in Papua New Guinea is the sudden
mass "surrender" of large groups of criminals to authorities. It usually
entails a public conversion to (charismatic or fundamentalist) Christian-
ity, the handing over of guns and ammunition to the police, public apol-
ogy for past crimes, and often (despite the criminals' history of serious
offenses including violence and occasionally killings) a waiving of any
prosecutions. 13 These conversions are highly charged affairs surrounded
by publicity and acclaim for the converts, who subsequently form them-
selves into "ex-criminal groups," with coordinators or leaders who
preach peace and harmony through the media and seek funds for various
projects.14 In effect, one strategy to achieve prestige is abandoned in favor
of another.
If commitment to a criminal lifestyle is engendered (for, strictly speak-
ing, this can no longer be regarded as a matter of "motivation") by the
factors described here, rather than by material poverty or indignation at
institutionalized social inequality, the rhetoric of disadvantage commonly
iterated by criminals themselves cannot be accepted at face value. I agree
with Morauta's observation (1986) that it courts sympathy, but I also
consider that it borrows from a simplistic class-based polemic to express
. -indignatiGn--of-a-diHe-rent-ol'der.-It-is-not-the-compal'ativ:e.-wealth-of an.-------
elite, or the structural inequalities perpetuated by the state, that many
Papua New Guineans (the rhetoric is not confined to criminals) find
offensive; it is the occasional tendency of such parties to default on the
system of obligations that underscores social relationships in Melanesia.
The relative personal success and wealth of individuals is acceptable if
they are seen to operate within this system, gifting, repaying or engender-
ing debts, enabling kin and prospective exchange partners to maintain
customary relationships that can be exploited one way or another. The
posthumous status of Iambakey Okuk as a folk hero throughout the high-
lands is to a large extent due to his ability for most of his career to remain
a part of the gift-economic system while achieving national prominence.
Parties who remove themselves from this system, or refuse to become part
of it, are hindrances to a dynamic social process and induce frustration
and resentment. The real import of the rhetoric of disadvantage is, I
think, encapsulated in a cynical comment to me by a gaoled criminal who
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had once done a "job" for a prominent citizen. "So now I am in gaol.
Where is he?"
At the beginning of this discussion I said that the analytic premises of
law-and-order discourse in Papua New Guinea generally overdetermine
those of discussions of gang crime. The analysis offered here contributes
very little to a search for solutions to the country's law-and-order prob-
lem, whose investigators are conventionally preoccupied with finding
criminogenic factors in developmental problems such as urbanization15
and unemployment. The suggestion that criminal lifestyles represent not a
response to unemployment, miseducation, or material poverty, but a
strategy in pursuit of prestige and an appropriation of commodities into a
gift economy represents a paradigm shift. Models developed initially in
response to criminological issues that arise from the transformation of
social relations of production accompanying the growth and spread of
industrial capitalism are inadequate in a situation where peripheral capi-
talism engages a precapitalist mode of production whose social relations
prove comparatively resilient in the encounter.
Rascalism in Papua New Guinea is undoubtedly a "law and order"
problem: it is disruptive, often very violent, and victimizes innocent peo-
ple. Rascals I have spoken with show little concern for the people (rich or,
more often, relatively poor) they steal from, mug, rape, or kill. However,
to-interpret-their-behavior-as-part-of-the-patholog-y-of-development,-or
underdevelopment, is to underestimate the dynamic and creative nature
of social responses to capitalism. The dispersal of goods, and mostly
cash, by interviewed gang members in pursuit of status or prestige, their
choice to pursue a career in crime when other more "orthodox" eco-
nomic options are available to them, the clamor of Bomana prison
inmates to relate their exploits and present themselves as "big-men,"
evoke ethnographically familiar Melanesian socioeconomic behavior,
rather than desperate underclass responses to problems of development.
The "gang" phenomenon in Papua New Guinea cannot be adequately
explained in terms of general motivational themes such as poverty, social
disintegration, or moral imperatives generated by perceptions of social
inequalities, as is demonstrated by the briefly sketched careers and atti-
tudes of the six criminals presented earlier. Instead, I suggest that rascal-
ism is an issue of a problematic encounter between a cash economy and a
generalized gift economy shared by a constellation of communities whose
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social relations remam stubbornly rooted in kin-ordered modes of
production.
Notes
I This strategy is also supported by the superficial observation that pursued
criminals flee into settlements. The assumption that they all live there habitually
is mistaken. It is easier to shake off pursuers through these labyrinthine areas
than through well-ordered and high-fenced suburban housing.
2 At time of writing the Internal Security Act is under legal challenge on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
3 The Tok Pisin word raskol originally had the same connotations as the
English-language word from which it is derived, but has come to be used of any-
one regularly engaged in crime, excluding white-collar crime.
4 The interviews were the beginning of an ongoing research project, which
has involved an informal coalition between Borrey, Sinclair Dinnen, and myself.
Neither Borrey nor Dinnen was involved in writing this article, but I benefited
from discussions with them and with Michael Monsell-Davis, and from com-
ments by Nancy Bowers and Jean Kennedy on an early draft.
5 This is not an idle boast. Papua New Guinea's gaols have poor security in
general, and individual and mass escapes from them are common.
----- ---~-b~ltisimpossi5IetoKnowwnich-iscorrecY; as prison recorara-re generaUy- ----~-~--
inadequate, apart from descriptions of charges, length of sentence, and the like.
The information presented in these sketches is extremely condensed and follows
much rechecking and cross-checking of the stories volunteered by prisoners who
were often keen to impress.
7 The Tok Pisin term wantok originally referred to shared language (more
than seven hundred different languages are spoken in Papua New Guinea), but
has become an elastic term denoting anything from shared kin-group member-
ship to shared provincial or regional origins, depending on geopolitical circum-
stances. A handy discussion of the origins and modern extension of wantokism
and of its burdens for people in urban employment has been provided by
Monsell-Davis (1993).
8 While this connotes kin-ordered production, I do not want to suggest that
labor in such communities has always been exclusively communal or group activ-
ity (a romantic contrast, in other words, to western "individualism")-nor, I am
sure, would Gregory.
9 Commodities stolen are mostly converted into cash by selling them very
quickly, often at prices that are a fraction of their real value (which is usually
If. .. ~ .
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known to the thieves). Even money from major heists, involving thousands of
kina, is drunk away in a bewilderingly short period.
10 Filer, who suggested this be called "road theory," mooted rot bilong kas-
tom (custom), rot bilong kaunsil (councils), and rot bilong kago (cargo, that
is, material goods) as other possibilities (1990, 85-86n). This phraseology, of
course, evokes Lawrence's publication Road Belong Cargo (1964), but should
not be taken to imply that I subscribe to Lawrence's explanation of "cargo cults."
I I See, for examples of the "walkathons" and the response, "Journey for
Help Ends, No Sign of Any as Yet," PNG Post-Courier, Wednesday, 13 October
1993,20; "It's a Long Way to Moresby, with Nothing to Show for It," Post-Cou-
rier, Tuesday, 9 November 1993, 3; "Stop These 'Walkathons'," Post-Courier,
Tuesday, 9 November 1993, 10 (editorial).
12 I am thinking, for example, of gender-based divisions of labor and the ana-
lytic problem of the value of women's labor in gardening and childbearing in the
context of interclan exchange relations.
I3 See, for example, "Gangsters Vow to Change Their Old Ways," PNG
Post-Courier, Friday, 8 October 1993, 13; "Sixty-five Young Men Surrender to
Police," Post-Courier, Thursday, 28 October 1993, 15.
14 In 1986, while doing fieldwork in the highlands (not on rascalism) I
encountered a group of young men on the Highlands Highway wearing T-shirts
bearing slogans announcing them to be ex-criminals for Christ. More recent
examples can be found in "Ex-rascals Share Joy of Independence," PNG Post-
Courier, Tuesday, 5 October 1993, 17; and" 'Bad Guy' Vows to Help in Fight
--- --against Crime~''-Posr-Courier,Tuesaay,19~Oct05er199
15 Statistics regarding urbanization in Papua New Guinea are no more reli-
able than those on crime, but some evidence suggests that the rate of urbaniza-
tion is not as great as many people assume and may therefore be a misdirection
of criminological attention. Hayes has pointed out that even using a "generous
definition" of "urban"-minimum population of 500 persons and density of
about 200 persons per square kilometer-85 percent of Papua New Guinea's
population still classify as "rural" (1992, 2-3). He also argued that the rate of
urbanization has in fact slowed down in the late 1980s and early 1990S, and sug-
gested that a review of the role of urbanization in Papua New Guinea's develop-
ment is urgently needed (1992,4-11).
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Abstract
This article critiques analyses that interpret gang crime, or "rascalism," in Papua
New Guinea as an underclass phenomenon. Illustrative sketches of gang mem-
bers' lifestyles and expressed attitudes toward their own criminal behavior are
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used to demonstrate a variety of social backgrounds and individual reasons for
pursuing a criminal career. Themes suggested by these sketches are explored
through a discussion of the Melanesian gift economy and common indigenous
understandings of the concept of development. That concept tends to be appre-
hended by Papua New Guineans in terms of the gift economy, with its complex
integration of issues of reciprocity, socioeconomic obligation, status, and
prestige.
Parallels are drawn between the behavior and attitudes of rascals and the
ethnographically familiar patterns of behavior by Papua New Guineans associ-
ated with the pursuit of status and prestige through the manipulation of relation-
ships of reciprocation and obligation. The "rascal" lifestyle is interpreted as a
strategy for pursuing prestige and the appropriation of commodities into a gift
economy. Rather than view rascalism as a product of poverty and unemployment
generated by processes of development or underdevelopment, it is analytically
useful to consider it as an issue of the problematic encounter between a cash
economy and an enduring, robust gift economy.
